Thursday, August 7, 2025

Speaker Johnson, a member of a false religion, prayed at a false wall, in support of a false religion.

 Speaker of The House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, a member of a false religion (Southern Baptism) * prays at a false wall in support of a false religion.

And Americans wonder why their country is going down the tubes.




HAYDOCK CATHOLIC BIBLE COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT

MATTHEW 24

CHAPTER XXIV.

Ver. 1. After the fatigues of preaching and teaching, Jesus towards evening left the temple, as it is in the Greek, eporeueto apo tou ierou, and went towards Mount Olivet, where he was accustomed to spend his nights, as we learn from S. Luke, c. xxi. v. penult. Jans. — His disciples came to shew him the buildings, not moved by curiosity, for they had seen them frequently before, but by pity; because he had on a former occasion, and only just before in Jerusalem, threatened the destruction of the temple and city, hoping that the splendour and magnificence of so fine a structure, consecrated to God, might alter his determination, as S. Hilarius observes. But the anger of God, provoked by sins, is not to be appeased with stones and buildings. He therefore answered them: (Jans.)

Ver. 2. Do you see all these things? Examine again and again all this magnificence, that the sentence of heaven may appear more striking. — A stone upon a stone. We need not look on this as an hyperbole. The temple burnt by the Romans, and afterwards even ploughed up. See Greg. Naz. orat. ii. cont. Julianum, Theodoret l. iii. Histor. c. xx. &c. Wi. — Julian the apostate, wishing to falsify the predictions of Daniel and of Jesus Christ, attempted to rebuild the temple. For this purpose, he assembled the chief among the Jews, and asking them why they neglected the prescribed sacrifices, was answered, that they could not offer any where else but in the temple of Jerusalem. Upon this he ordered them to repair to Jerusalem, to rebuild their temple, and restore their ancient worship, promising them his concurrence in carrying on the work. This filled the Jews with inexpressible joy. Hence flocking to Jerusalem, they began with scorn and triumph to insult over the Christians. Contributions came in from all parts. The Jewish women stripped themselves of their most costly ornaments. The emperor opened his treasures to furnish every thing necessary for the building. The most able workmen were convened from all parts; persons of the greatest distinction were appointed to direct the work; and the emperor's friend, Alipius, was set over the whole, with orders to carry on the work without ceasing, and to spare no expense. All materials were laid in to an immense quantity. The Jews of both sexes bore a share in the labour; the women helping to dig the ground, and carry away the rubbish in their aprons and gowns. It is even said that the Jews appointed some pick-axes, spades, and baskets, to be made of silver, for the honour of the work. Till this time the foundations and some ruins of the walls had remained, as appears from S. Cyril, in his catechism xv. n. 15. and Euseb. Dem. Evang. l. viii. p. 406. These ruins the Jews first demolished with their own hands, thus concurring to the accomplishment of our Saviour's prediction. They next began to dig a new foundation, in which many thousands were employed. But what they had thrown up in the day, was, by repeated earthquakes, the night following cast back again into the trench. When Alipius the next day was earnestly pressing on the work, with the assistance of the governor of the province, there issued, says Ammianus Marcellinus, such horrible balls of fire out of the earth near the foundations, as to render the place inaccessible from time to time to the scorched workmen. And the victorious element continuing in this manner obstinately bent, as it were, to drive them to a distance, Alipius, thought proper to abandon, though reluctantly, the enterprise. This great event happened in the beginning of the year 363, and with many very astonishing circumstances is recorded both by Jews and Christians. See the proofs and a much fuller account of this astonishing event, which all the ancient fathers describe as indubitable, in Alban Butler's life of S. Cyril of Jerusalem, March 18th. Thus they so completely destroyed whatever remained of the ancient temple, that there was not left one stone upon another; nor were they permitted by heaven even to begin the new one. Maldonatus.


St Alban's Lives of the Saints 

March 18.—ST. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM.

CYRIL was born at or near the city of Jerusalem, about the year 315. He was ordained priest by St. Maximus, who gave him the important charge of instructing and preparing the candidates for Baptism. This charge he held for several years, and we still have one series of his instructions, given in the year 347 or 318. They are of singular interest as being the earliest record of the systematic teaching of the Church on the creed and sacraments, and as having been given in the church built by Constantine on Mount Calvary. They are solid, simple, profound; saturated with Holy Scripture; exact, precise, and terse; and, as a witness and exposition of the Catholic faith, invaluable. On the death of St. Maximus, Cyril was chosen Bishop of Jerusalem. At the beginning of his episcopate a cross was seen in the air reaching from Mount Calvary to Mount Olivet, and so bright that it shone at noonday. St. Cyril gave an account of it to the emperor; and the faithful regarded it as a presage of victory over the Arian heretics. While Cyril was bishop, the apostate Julian resolved to falsify the words of Our Lord by rebuilding the Temple at Jerusalem. He employed the power and resources of a Roman emperor; the Jews thronged enthusiastically to him and gave munificently. But Cyril was unmoved. " The word of God abides," he said; "one stone shall not be laid on another." When the attempt was made, a heathen writer tells us that horrible flames came forth from the earth, rendering the place inaccessible to the scorched and scared workmen. The attempt was made again and again, and then abandoned in despair. Soon after, the emperor perished miserably in a war against the Persians, and the Church had rest. Like the other great bishops of his time, Cyril was persecuted, and driven once and again from his see; but on the death of the Arian Emperor Valens he returned to Jerusalem. He was present at the second General Council at Constantinople, and died in peace in 386, after a troubled episcopate of thirty-five years.

Reflection.—"As a stout staff," says St. John Chrysostom, "supports the trembling limbs of a feeble old man, so does faith sustain our vacillating mind, lest it be tossed about by sinful hesitation and perplexity."


St Cyril Catechetical Lecture 15

15. And again he says, Who opposes and exalts himself against all that is called God, or that is worshipped; (against every God; Anti Christ  forsooth will abhor the idols,) so that he seats himself in the temple of God. 2 Thessalonians 2:4What temple then? He means, the Temple of the Jews which has been destroyed. For God forbid that it should be the one in which we are! Why say we this? That we may not be supposed to favour ourselves. For if he comes to the Jews as Christ, and desires to be worshipped by the Jews, he will make great account of the Temple, that he may more completely beguile them; making it supposed that he is the man of the race of David, who shall build up the Temple which was erected by Solomon. And Antichrist  will come at the time when there shall not be left one stone upon another in the Temple of the Jews, according to the doom pronounced by our Saviour ; for when, either decay of time, or demolition ensuing on pretence of new buildings, or from any other causes, shall have overthrown all the stones, I mean not merely of the outer circuit, but of the inner shrine also, where the Cherubim were, then shall he come with all signs and lying wonders, exalting himself against all idols ; at first indeed making a pretence of benevolence, but afterwards displaying his relentless temper, and that chiefly against the Saints of God. For he says, I beheld, and the same horn made war with the saints ; and again elsewhere, there shall be a time of trouble, such as never was since there was a nation upon earth, even to that same time. Dreadful is that beast, a mighty dragon, unconquerable by man, ready to devour; concerning whom though we have more things to speak out of the divine scriptures , yet we will content ourselves at present with thus much, in order to keep within compass.

*  https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02278a.htm



Wednesday, August 6, 2025

The existence of God (2)

 The Five Proofs: The First Proof from Passivity -- Motion

The first proof proceeds from the fact of motion or, to put the same thing in another way, from the fact of the passivity of things. Its extremely simple formulation can be made in these terms: because nothing that is moved moves or changes itself, the unquestionable fact of movement or change in the world about us, forces us to conclude to the existence of a first mover who is not himself moved. That is all of the proof. Its very brevity is reason enough for a somewhat lengthy explanation of it.

The phrase, "nothing moves or changes itself," means only that a thing cannot be, relative to the same goal, merely movable and already moved, merely changeable and already changed; for the starting point and the goal of the process of becoming are necessarily different. The mere aptitude for receiving motion is not its own completion. The common sense fundamental back of this phrase, then, is simply that what is not possessed cannot be bestowed; and the very notion of potentiality is the absence of perfection that can be possessed but so far is not, for, unless we maintain that contraries are identical, a potentiality is not its actualization.

Actually this argument goes back a step farther, beyond the cause of change to the cause of that which is changed, back of the cause of becoming to the cause of being. For the immediate cause of change alone is itself in the process of becoming by its very causality; the mover of a potentially movable thing is himself moved by the very movement by which he moves this thing, he becomes something other than he was. The peddler does something to himself as well as to his pushcart when he bends his strength to its movement. Unless we come to a cause that produces that which is subject to change, to a cause that does not itself become something other than it was, the process of becoming or change cannot start. Briefly, what is in question here is not the process of motion, but the existence of that perfection which is motion.

It is obvious, then, that the term "mover" is used of the first and of secondary movers not in an identical, but only in a proportional, sense; for the first mover is the cause of being and is himself unchanged, while secondary movers are causes of change and are themselves changed in their action. It is to this unique first mover that the argument concludes.

A not uncommon fallacy today is to suppose that since this particular movement is caused by another, this latter by another, and so on, there is no need for further explanation since it is taken for granted that the world is eternal. From this point of view, since you can never come to thc end of the chain of movers, there is no mystery about the present movement. The fallacy lies in the fact that without a beginning the whole thing could not start; no one of these previous movers is sufficient explanation of itself and its effect on others, yet a sufficient explanation must be found if the fact of movement is to be intelligible, if we are not to have something coming from nothing. The haze of distance or the weight of time do not do away with the necessity of explanation any more than they offer a positive explanation. To be satisfied with this is to be satisfied with the removal of the question to more obscure quarters, comforted by its consequent vagueness. The plain fact is that unless we come to a mover that is in no way dependent we have not explained the existence of the movers who are undoubtedly dependent either for their actual movement or for the power to move; where the effects are patently present the cause ultimately explaining them is not to be denied.

Two things are to be particularly noted about this first proof for the existence of God: the narrowness of the conclusion and the independence of the argument from the element of time. The argument adheres rigidly to the limits of its premises; it concludes to a first mover unmoved -- and to nothing more. There is nothing more which can be concluded from the sensible fact of motion with which the argument started. Because there is movement, there is a cause of cosmic movement which is itself unmoved. The argument is not a sputtering flame to be extinguished by the simple expedient of blanketing it with centuries. There is no question here of movement beginning in time. It is not a question of a present reality demanding a cause in the past. It is simply a question of the universe as given, movement or change as experienced, and the conclusion that such a movement or change is unintelligible without a first mover communicating movement to all things. Time makes no difference. If the eternity of the world were to be proved tomorrow beyond all doubt, this proof would be in no way affected; the fact of change is there, the effect is with us, its cause cannot be denied.

The background for the other four proofs is exactly the same as for this first one. Keeping the preliminary notions, explained above, well in mind and holding to the detailed explanation of this first proof, the others can be seen readily. The. point at issue is always the same: the existence of perfection that did not previously exist.

The Second Proof: from Activity -- Causality

The second proof proceeds from causality or the activity of things. Here it is a question of the existence of an efficient cause, the external agent by whose operation a thing exists, the question of the existence of the hen that laid an egg, of the thunderbolt which struck a man dead, the storm that has battered a ship into helplessness. The starting point is again the sensible world.

We see in that sensible world an order of efficient causes dependent one on the other for their causality -- the powder which propels the shell, which in turn crashes into a storage tank of gasoline, and this throwing out a sheet of flame in the heart of a city, and so on. We find nothing that is the cause of itself. Precisely because of this impossibility of a cause causing itself, the efficient causes of the sensible world force the conclusion upon us that a first efficient cause exists which is itself uncaused.

Here it is said that it is impossible for a cause to cause itself for the same fundamental reason as was exposed in the first argument, namely, because the starting point and the goal of change, the potentiality and its realization, cannot be identical. Otherwise we are identifying opposites, saying that the potentiality is the actuality. Here again, as in the first proof, the argument is really stronger than it looks; for the only alternative is not merely identifying opposites, it is identifying non-reality with reality, non-being with being, for the transition is not from potentiality to actuality but from the purely privative condition of nothingness to existence. Here again it must be noted that the term "cause" is used, not identically, but proportionally, of the first and secondary causes.

A difficulty may be offered to this argument, the difficulty of living causes where the dependence is not so immediately obvious. And the answer is that no one living cause explains the efficacy of the species to which it belongs and from which it derives its power to cause. Yet that efficacy must have its explanation. Infinite regress get us nowhere: without the first uncaused cause there will be no effects produced by any cause no matter how many eons are placed between the beginning of things and the world of today. It is not a question of time, nor is the question made more difficult by adding on a few million years to the age of the world. Again attention must be called to the strict adherence of the conclusion to the evidence in hand: the argument concludes to the existence of a cause that is itself uncaused, nothing more. Either of these two arguments is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of God; their effectiveness is not a matter of accumulative evidence. They are merely different angles, shafts of light focusing on the same spectacle of divinity but taking their rise from different starting points in the sensible world.

The Third Proof: from Defectibility -- Contingency

The third proof proceeds from our experience of the contingency or defectibility of things. It can be stated briefly like this: if any beings exist whose essence is not one with their existence (that is, which are contingent), then a being exists whose essence is its existence (that is, an absolutely necessary being). The fact is that in the world about us we see things that can have or lose existence, that begin to exist and cease to exist, that are born and that die. If everything were of this nature, that is if existence is not essentially natural to anything, then nothing would ever exist; which is patently false in view of the existing world. The argument proceeds as do the preceding ones: if things are capable of beginning to exist or of ceasing to exist, then, since they do in fact exist and cease to exist, that capability is fulfilled, that potentiality is realized, and a potentiality cannot realize itself. Much less can nothingness produce that which is the subject of realized potentialities.

The objection of physically necessary substances is answered as was the fundamental objection to the preceding arguments. No such physically necessary being explains its own necessity but receives it (an actualized potentiality). So the necessity of the species is not explained by the species itself; "a multitude of contingent things do not make a necessary thing any more than a multitude of idiots make one intelligent man." This necessity must be explained by a necessary being that does not receive necessity, but that is its necessity. Again the element of time makes no difference. An infinite chain of beings that receive their necessity, or of beings which are not necessary, neither complicates nor explains the difficulty; it merely attempts to dodge the problem by hiding under the accumulation of immediate causes or the accumulation of the years.

These first three proofs have argued to the existence of God from the passivity, the activity and the contingency of things. The fourth proof argues from the perfection of things. But the argument still proceeds from the world of reality, not necessarily the world of sense experience, sense impressions, but nonetheless from the world of reality. For the real world also includes the things we understand as well as the things we feel, such things as love, justice, friendship, things that we can never grow in the garden or meet on the street but which are, for all that, decidedly realities.

The perfections in question here are only the absolute perfections that carry the note of perfection in themselves, not the relative which are perfections only because of their order to something else. Examples of such absolute perfections are animality, rationality, life, existence. And these can be roughly classified by stressing the point that they are in themselves either strictly limited or completely limitless.

As examples of the strictly limited, we may mention animality or humanity. A man is no less an animal than a lion; nor has a sickly boy less humanity than a strapping giant. These things imply definitely fixed limits. They either are or are not fully possessed; there is never any question of having a little or a great deal of them. To exceed or to fall away from the fixed limit means the complete loss of that perfection. As examples of the limitless perfections, there are life, goodness, existence, and so on. If there are limits to these perfections in this or that individual or species, the limitation does not come from the perfection itself. We note the source of the limitation in our very manner of speech when we speak of human life and animal life, though it never occurs to us to speak of human rationality or animal animality.

Since it is precisely from these unlimited perfections that the proof of the existence of God proceeds, it may be worth while pointing out some of their characteristics. Perhaps the most noticeable is that these perfections are possessed by different kinds of being in an analogous, not an identical, way; thus, for instance, we speak of a good stone, a good fruit, a good horse or a good professor according as each has its due perfection. Obviously the goodness of the professor is not identically the same as the goodness of fruit. There is proportionality there, but not identity. The second particularly noteworthy characteristic is that these perfections are realizable in different degrees; thus, in the course of one lifetime a man may be bad, of mediocre virtue, of more than average virtue, and ultimately a saint.

The Fourth Proof: from Perfection -- Participation

The fourth proof for the existence of God can be stated succinctly. In the world about us we see these perfections existing in things in greater and lesser degrees: that is, we see things that are more and less good, more and less true, and so on; we see life within human limits, animal limits, plant limits. Now these limited degrees of limitless perfections can be explained only by the existence of something to which these perfections pertain in their fullness, something which does not possess this or that degree of goodness, truth, life, but which is, by its very nature, limitless goodness, limitless truth, limitless life.

Certainly these limited degrees of limitless perfections are not explained by the natures which possess them. For what flows from the essential principles of a nature is had in its fullness; humanity is not something a man achieves after a long struggle. Moreover, perfections which flow from nature do not vary: the spoiled lapdog is not less animal as the days pass, the puppy does not grow into his animality. Yet, as a matter of fact, in the world about us these limitless perfections of goodness, life and the rest are not had in their fullness and they vary with an infinite variety.

The explanation, then, must be sought outside of the natures which possess a limited edition of a limitless virtue, that is, in some extrinsic source which has the perfection perfectly. Otherwise we meet the fundamental obstacle erected by an identification of contraries, of a potentiality bringing about its own realization, indeed, of the absence of perfection bringing about the presence of perfection. In a word, these limited editions of limitless virtues are received virtues; in the ultimate analysis, they are explicable only by some being who has not received them but to whom they belong, in their limitlessness, by the very nature of that being. Nor is this a question of a jump from the ideal to the real order. These effects -- human life, the goodness of a man -- are decidedly in the real order. It is not a matter of having an ideal rule by which we may measure these perfections; but of having a real, existing cause by whose action these realities have been brought into being.

This fourth proof proceeded from multiplicity to unity, from the multiplicity of shared or received perfections to the unity of essentially possessed perfection. The fifth proof proceeds from an ordered multiplicity to an ordering unity. The order of the world, which is at the starting point of this proof, furnished one of the most constant evidences of the existence of God to men through the ages. It appealed to Greek poets and philosophers; in un-philosophic form it was preserved in the Sacred Writings of the Jews; primitive peoples appealed to it in their origin myths. It has been not only one of the most ancient of the proofs but one of the most popular. It has been accepted as genuine by the uneducated who were unable to follow its philosophical implications; and, at the same time, was the only proof given a measure of respect by the great Kant.

It was perhaps to be expected that modern philosophy, with its contempt for the past should most strenuously assail this particular proof. Some will say that it was destroyed by the theory of evolution which, telling a tale of the process of development, made unnecessary all explanation of the beginning of that process. Again, the facts of reality are said to be adequately explained by blind chance or by necessity. We shall look at these last two modern (and ancient) objections more closely after we have seen the proof itself.

The Fifth Proof: from Order -- Finality

The fifth proof for the existence of God proceeds just as did the other four, demanding no more, resting on just as solid a foundation. It has the same starting point of facts in the world in which we live; it makes use of the same fundamental principle of reason and of things, namely, that opposites are not identical. Here the point in question is the existence of an order; the search for its explanation leads us to a supreme intelligence.

The argument might be phrased briefly like this. In thc world about us we see things devoid of intelligence acting for an end, a fact which is evident from their always, or generally, acting in thc same orderly way to attain that which is best for them. Evidently these actions are placed, not by accident, but on purpose. As things devoid of intelligence do not act for an end unless they be directed by some intelligence, we must conclude that a supreme intelligence exists which directs all natural things to their end.

An immediately obvious difficulty against this argument seems to be that it presumes the order of the world; this order is by no means a fact of experience. If there is such an order in the world, we have not discovered it yet. As a matter of fact, this objection has its roots in the lush soil of confusion, the confusion of external and internal finality. To solve the mystery of external finality we would have to know all the answers to such questions as the external reason for the bite of a mosquito, the existence of a snake, the destruction wrought by a hurricane. We simply do not know these things; certainly we do not know all of them and probably we never shall. It is asking a good deal to demand an exhaustive measurement of divine plans by such an instrument as the mind of a man. As a matter of fact, we do not have to plumb the mystery of external finality for the purposes of this argument.

It is quite sufficient that we establish the fact of internal finality. That we can and do know without doubt. We do know that the eye is constructed for purposes of seeing, the car for hearing; that a mosquito bites for purposes of nourishment, that the snake's fangs are weapons of defense, and so on. Knowledge such as this is sufficient for the starting point of this fifth proof for the existence of God. Indeed, only one such instance of internal finality would give grounds enough for the proof. This fact of internal finality is quite sufficient to absolve this argument from the charge of anthropomorphism which some philosophers have levelled against it. The argument does not demand that we search the soul of a snake or a mosquito to unearth motives, intentions or plans; it asks merely that we recognize the fact of a constant order of cause to effect.

This internal order is not to be explained by chance. Such an explanation is an insult to common sense: my ear might just as well have turned out to be an organ of smell; on such grounds, is it not surprising that so many animals have ears? The ratio of the chances for a simultaneous chance development of the thirteen conditions immediately necessary for sight has been figured out as 9,999,985 to 15; yet the thing happens every day!

Putting aside the appeal of common sense, which is strangely suspect by the modern philosopher, the explanation of the order of the world by chance is philosophically unsound. Certainly chance exists. It is just chance that a bald-headed man is caught in a thunder-shower without his hat; but obviously if there were no reason for his being out, no reason for the shower, the heavy drops would not now be smacking off the smooth surface of his head. In other words, the very existence of chance presupposes the existence of the essential; chance is no more than the clash of two causes attempting to pursue their own purposive ways; it is an accident which happens to the essential, not which explains or does away with the essential. If everything happens by chance, then all nature is reduced to the level of the accidental; things are not essentially what they are, but only accidentally so, the mirage may melt away before the groping fingers of our mind.

Such an explanation is no explanation at all; it is a contradiction. It is the by now familiar absurdity of explaining the perfect by the imperfect, the greater by the less, order by the lack of order. Or, to put it bluntly, it identifies opposites potentiality with its realization or potentiality with the lack of all being. And we are faced with the old dilemma of denying the potentialities of the medical student and the perfections of the doctor or of denying the difference between the two; that is, we are back to the impossible attempt to deny facts.

The modern, intent on dodging the infinite, is not at all dashed by the breakdown of an explanation which he will confidently use again as soon as the thunder of reason's guns has died down. For the moment he solves the problem by denying it: the order of the world is explained by the necessity of nature; God is unnecessary because the world is self-sufficient. In plain language, this means that order is discernible in the world, science can continue with its investigation of this order, because things are what they are; this is their nature, they are determined by necessary physical laws to this way of being and of acting, nature itself supplies the necessary determination.

No real question is solved by pretending it does not exist: and this is a real question. The solution offered on the grounds of necessity merely pushes the question back. Whence comes this determination, this necessary inclination to determined action? What is the source of the necessity of nature and of physical laws? Obviously it does not explain itself; chance will not do as an explanation; the only possible solution is a cause above nature, an intelligence that is supreme. Not any intelligcnce will do. For if that intelligence is not supreme, then it is not intelligence but a nature which has intelligence, that is, a nature determined, inclined, ordered to know; and we have the same problem all over again -- whence comes this determination, this inclination, this order? This ultimately explanatory intelligence must be, not have, intelligence; it must not be ordered to knowing but must be its own knowledge.

A Posteriori Arguments

Such are the proofs for the existence of God. They have their foundations deep in the solid earth while their superstructure sweeps up to the heights of divinity. These proofs are not airy abstractions, they are not vague constructs made to substitute, in the dim light of argumentation, for solid reality. They are inferential proofs, a posteriori proofs, inductions based on the facts of the sensible world and the first principles of reason. The facts upon which they are based are in no sense disputed facts; given the movement of an eyelash, the perfection of a stone or the contingency of a sigh, these proofs hold. Surely, in all common sense, the foundation asked from the senses for these proofs cannot be denied.

On the other hand, the principle of reason involved in these proofs is no less indisputable. It cannot be denied without the denial of all intellectual activities, without the denial of the world of reality; indeed, it cannot be denied without being affirmed. For this principle is simply that a thing is what it is, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time, it cannot be itself and something else; in other words, the principle insists that differences are not identities, that potentialities are not their actualizations, that non-being is not identical with being.

Independently Sufficient

The philosopher who, for reasons best known to himself, decides to challenge these proofs has entered a war of cosmic proportions; fortunately for himself, he cannot win. Such a victory would be his own annihilation. These proofs are not aimed at a cumulative effect; they are totally different from the mass of arguments gathered in support of the hypothesis of evolution, they are not the frail threads woven into the strong cloth of a prosecuting attorney's circumstantial argument. From all of them, or from any one of them, the existence of God is established; from any one of them as a starting point, it can be shown that God is existence itself, the perfect being, ens a se.

Strictly Limited to Evidence

No fault can be found with their procedure, for they adhere rigidly to the evidence in hand and conclude within the proper limits of this evidence. The knowledge they give is not that of probability, not even of very high probability; rather it is knowledge of metaphysical certitude, excluding every other possibility, leaving only the first mover, the first cause, the necessary being and so on as the ultimate answer to the facts of the world of reality.

Implications

That these proofs have been shrugged off as meaningless to men, devoid of qualitative content, is something the thinking man will always be unable to understand; and for the very good reason that such an attitude is unintelligible. The following chapters will bring out at length the implications of these notions; but without further elaboration these arguments bow down under the weight of the ripe fruit of profound significance. Thus, for instance, the fact of the existence of a first unmoved mover means that there is no movement, from the crushing force of a tidal wave to the rise and fall of a breast in sleep which does not depend every instant on God; there is no change, from the imperceptible coloring of a leaf in autumn to the upheaval of a social revolution in which God does not play a major part. The existence of a first uncaused cause means that in the swaying struggle of men's lives, the triumphs of their greatest thoughts and works, their masterpieces, their literature, their architecture, the soarings of the poet or the crisp command of the soldier, there is no instant from which God can be excluded. No walls are thick enough, no wastes lonely enough, no army powerful enough, no governmental edict sweeping enough, no hatred bitter enough to exclude the action of the first cause.

Significance of the Proofs

The existence of an absolutely necessary being means there is a divine sustaining hand whose withdrawal means annihilation; it means that we cannot contact anything of reality without confronting divinity; that God is closer to us than we are to ourselves, that every moment of life, every particle of dust, every stitch of a garment is permeated with divinity or it could not continue to be. That there is an all perfect being means that all the beauty, the love, the goodness that lift the heart of a man out of himself are but shadows of the infinite on the pool of life, vague hints of the ineffable that lies at the beginning and end of life. That a supreme intelligence exists makes it plain that the hairs of our head are indeed numbered; that there is no step, no breath, no success or failure that is without its meaning, without its place in a divine plan, a supreme order, that necessarily goes beyond the human mind's power of assimilation.

Real Mystery of Beginnings

These proofs may be attacked as wild abstractions of reason without solid foundation or as cold reasonings that have no meaning, no interest to men. Both accusations are completely false: these are scientific proofs based on the world of reality; they are of an inexhaustible significance and interest to men. If the truth were honestly faced, it would be evident that the real grounds for the modern unease in their presence is the fact that they lead the mind of men to the ultimate mystery. Every beginning is mysterious because every beginning has a drop of the exotic perfume of divinity on its garments. Every beginning is a bridge spanning the chasm between what can be and what is, by its very existence proclaiming the perfection and the mystery of its builder, the ultimate Beginning who laid the foundations upon which every such bridge must be built. The most prosaic beginning intrigues our mind. for the humblest beginning poses a question that only divinity answers and only divinity can fully understand that answer. By a beginning something has come into being that did not exist before; it is a sleight of hand trick, a bit of magic that cannot be true, a mouse giving birth to a mountain unless we come to the Beginning that never began and always is, to the limitlessness that explains the limited, to the utterly independent which is the sole support of the dependent. When we have arrived at that ultimate answer, we are face to face with the incomprehensible precisely because we are in the presence of the limitless.

Non-Mysterious Substitutes

To the man who confusedly identifies human excellence with absolute supremacy, this sort of thing is intolerable; what overflows the measure of the human mind simply cannot exist, for this would be a refutation of the excellence of man. Some other solution must be had, something not mysterious, something that can be weighed, measured and put in its place by the human god of the universe. It may be this man will try to satisfy his mind, and his heart, by the absurdities of order explained by chance, by the blindness of necessity that has no source, or the deceit of substituting a process for an explanation. But such things can satisfy the mind of a man only by destroying it; they do not solve the problem of a beginning, they dodge it, deny it, destroy it, whereas the mind of man can be satisfied only with an answer. If we are to have that answer, we must face the fact of mystery, for mystery can be eliminated only at the cost of eliminating the beginning and so eliminating all that follows from that beginning. Perhaps, some day, the modern man will learn that mystery is not the prison of the mind of man, it is his home.


Tuesday, August 5, 2025

The existence of God (1)


HE WHO IS

(Q. 2)

It is more than the perennial vigor of human hope that makes human life a long process of constant beginnings. A beginning never becomes a prosaic thing, though we see its counterparts on all sides every day; it is in itself glamorous, enticing, irresistible, for it is in itself mysterious. The feeble spark of young life in a mother's womb, the first tentative plan of the architect, the first step of the infant, the first scribbled words of a book fascinate us. They swing open doors and we cannot resist straining our eyes to peer down the long corridors of the future they reveal to us. It is not an explanation of this attraction to say that this moment of beginning is tightly packed with love's rewards, love's labors and love's hopes. It is all of this; but it is much more. It is that inexplicable thing that we call mystery, the thing that calls our minds out on the long road along whose winding way the explanation of the mystery may be found.

The mystery and difficulty of beginnings

The woman who gives birth to a child is not only a cause of a wondrous effect, she herself has become what she was not before, a mother. It is not only the marble under the sculptor's chisel that has become something new; the sculptor has undergone a process of becoming in producing his masterpiece, he has fulfilled a formerly unfulfilled capacity within himself. For in these human beginnings the process of becoming wraps its arms around both cause and effect to pile wonder on wonder and yet leave the mystery intact, the mystery of the beginning of that which becomes both in the cause and the effect, the mystery of the beginning not of becoming but of being itself.

Difficulty for Beginners

Beginnings are not only mysterious, they are also difficult. Perhaps it is because they are mysterious that beginnings are so hard; at least, it is a fact that it is always difficult to begin at the beginning. That is a divine way of doing things, the divine way that made the Son of God start human life as an infant. For divinity itself is the Beginning and is naturally careful of beginnings, even of human beginnings which are but fragments gathered up from the feasts of the past. Surely the Catholic Doctor must be careful, even exhaustively careful, of beginnings: so careful that his works must be aimed, not merely at the learned or saintly, but at those humble beginners who are his particular care as an exponent of the things that pertain to God.

Reasons for a Beginning

Beginnings are hard for us even when we ourselves are capable, the material on which we work is apt, and the work we have to do is no more than to coax to full bloom hidden beauties in the material and in ourselves. To our minds, the uncreated beginning faced the extreme difficulty, not of drawing out hidden powers, but of establishing that which is. Beginners in the way of God, which is to say beginners in the way of human living, face a man-made difficulty that springs from the reluctance of their teachers to begin at the beginning, a difficulty that is only hinted at when we call it a lack of order in the presentation of truth. That reluctance is not difficult to understand: there is an attractive, though completely false, air of excitement in dodging difficulty, shutting one's eyes to mystery and plunging into the middle of things.

Objections

That excitement has so gripped the modern mind that the beginning of things has become irritating to the point of consuming much of modern energy just in the elimination of it. These reasons for a beginning, which are sometimes called the proofs for the existence of God, have been excluded on thee grounds that the human intellect cannot be trusted outside the boundaries of direct sense experience. Of course, many other objections have been made to them: scientific objections, such as their pitiful dependence on an Aristotelian science long since defunct; they are not the product of scientific investigation; they are in evident conflict with the history of religion and the theory of evolution, both of which show that the Christian God is a very modern luxury.

If the philosopher's patience is worn thin enough, he may protest that the results of such proofs are meaningless, devoid of qualitative content; which means this philosopher has been much too lazy to think. In desperation, the philosopher may simply toss the proofs out the window regardless of their truth or falsehood; the God they speak of is of no value or service to humanity. And this will be a philosopher who takes all the important things for granted.

Their Perennial Strength

These proofs may be a nuisance to one who tries, philosophically, to keep up with the times at whatever cost; but they cannot be denied modernity if by modern we mean to occupy a place in the minds and words of men of our day. They are strong enough, independent enough to live through this age and all ages. They ask no favors. They ask only what cannot be denied -- and then make the most of it.

Specifically these proofs for the existence of God start with a simplicity worthy of the divinity they demonstrate, demanding just two things: a fact evident to the senses and the first principles of the intellect. Understand, now, this sensible fact is not carefully selected, difficult to see or subject to controversy; but an obvious, tangible reality of experience, such a fact as the wink of an eye, the birth of a child, the withering of a leaf, the beauty of a face or the smooth flight of a bird. The first principles of knowledge demanded are only those fundamentals without which intellectual operation of any kind is impossible, the principles which are the rock bottom of being as well as of thought and without which science itself is invalid, nay unthinkable. In thoroughly modern fashion, these reasons proceed carefully, cautiously, adhering strictly to the evidence in hand. They are not dependent on a system of science, a weight of tradition or subjective dispositions to make their way in the world. They are genuine.

Their Completeness

The proofs for the existence of God do not belong on the dubious fringe of philosophy but in a place of honor; they have fought a bitter battle in defense of the intellect of man. A complete treatment of the existence of a beginning of things must always be a three-sided fight which must be won on all fronts or the intellect is lost. On one side are the champions of the ineptitude of man who insist that man's one distinctive power of intellect has no intrinsic value; of course it cannot prove the existence of God. At the opposite extreme is the camp of optimists and emotionalists, one group insisting the existence of God needs no proof since it is self-evident, the other tacitly admitting the intellectual incapacity of man but holding for an emotional assurance of the Supreme Being. In the middle, carrying the brunt of the offensive today, are those who champion man by destroying God, claiming there is no God, at least no such God as the Christians worship.

The fight is bitter. Because not all men and women have the appetite for fighting, or the time and ability to carry on the fight to the end, and because so very much hangs on the outcome of the battle, infallible authority has come forth to protect those who by force of circumstance are non-combatants. By that authority, the man who cannot follow the intricacies of proof, either by reason of inability or lack of leisured time, knows beyond question that the reason of man, by its own power, can certainly know the existence of God and that God, the supreme Being, certainly exists.

The gesture of authority is necessary, not because the truth it defends is beyond the range of the guns of reason, but because it is essential that every man know of God's existence for his individual life, just as it is essential for the world about man that God exist. The thinker who has seen and grasped the proof has no need of authority; he holds that truth by a clear insight into a natural truth. This man can prove the existence of God; by that proof he has also shown that the existence of God is not self-evident, it does not rest on an emotional assurance, it does not escape the powers of the mind of man. It is a proved fact.

Preliminary Notions

Of course this man did not arrive at the proof of the existence of God effortlessly, as he might come to the point of raising a beard. The proof demands hard work, the hard work of thinking; certainly this man would have to have some preliminary notions accurately in mind before he could take a step towards the proof itself.

Potentiality and Actuality

There is, for instance, the simple, but decidedly abstract notion of potentiality and actuality, a notion that is perhaps grasped more easily by seeing it in the complex notion of change. Let us look at these notions in a rather clumsy example. Let us take a large, perfectly plain block of marble; then put a sculptor to work on it and have him make a statue of that block of marble. We say, rightly, that in the original marble block there is the potentiality of becoming a statue, the principle or aptitude for receiving this further perfection, the quality of being changed. It may be worth noting that by "perfection" here we mean any respect in which a thing can be completed or become more determinate in its being. When the process is complete, that potentiality has been realized, the marble block has become a statue.

Change: Potential, Process and Product

We call this process of realizing potentialities "becoming," and whole philosophies have been built upon it. More simply, we call it "change;" in its positive form we give it the name of "development." Whatever we call it, it is nothing more or less than the motion from potentiality to actuality, from the mere capability of receiving perfection to the perfection received. This is motion in its widest sense; it takes place in every change, of canvas and tubes of paint into a masterpiece, of a farmhand into a doctor of medicine, of an acorn into an oak, as well as in a journey from Chicago to New York. Obviously, this process of change involves three things: (1) a potential or starting point which is prior to the change and contains the potentiality, a thing which is already something but with the capacity for becoming something else, for receiving an added perfection; (2) the reality of the process or movement of change which proceeds from the potential to the actual; (3) the product of the change, the actual needed perfection. It is essential that we hold fast to the obvious fact of a distinct difference between the potentiality and its goal of realization. If this difference be denied, we are forced into a denial of both ends of a change, potentialities and actualities, or into an identification of these two. In either case we are in the impossible position of holding to a motion as eerie as a faceless smile, a motion that has come from nowhere and goes nowhere, or of holding to the absurdity that contradictories are identical, that there is no distinction between the undeveloped and the developed, between farmhands and doctors, marble blocks and statues.

The particular value of clarity in this notion of change lies in the fact that it brings out the complete necessity of explaining every realized potentiality, every perfection, by an explanation external to the realized potentiality itself. It makes more obvious the truth that a developed perfection is not its own explanation, it has not developed itself, nor is it explained by the potentiality which it perfected.

Another value, for our purpose of proving the existence of God, is had from the difference this process of becoming, or change, brings out between the action of God and of creatures. It is on the basis of this process of becoming that we argue from effects to causes in created causes and their effects. Where the cause is divine, the fundamental question remains the same, that is, the explanation of a perfection that is not self-explanatory, that has not produced itself. In this latter case, however, it is not a question of a cause drawing a potentiality to perfection, but of a cause producing that which possesses the potentialities. In a word, the question in this case is not of the cause of becoming (or change) but of the cause of being itself; the transition is not from potentiality to actualization of potentiality, but from non-being to being.

Limitations

One other preliminary notion that must be clarified before proceeding to the actual proofs for the existence of God is the limitation of all proofs for existence. As a matter of fact, there are only two possibilities for proof of the existence of anything: the direct proof offered by sense experience, such as a man has of the existence of a door by ramming his nose against it; and the inferential or a posteriori proof, such as a detective might have of the existence of a murderer when he finds an armless paralytic dangling on a four-foot rope from a rafter fifteen feet above the floor. The detective, by his type of proof, may never come to more than an extremely great probability because it may be impossible to rule out all possibilities other than murder. Where it is possible to rule out all other possibilities, this proof by inference, the a posteriori proof, gives complete certitude.

No other proof of existence is possible, no a priori proof is valid, because existence in no way enters into the very nature of created things; we cannot argue from the nature of things to their existence, as we can argue from the nature of man to the spirituality of his soul. As we shall see, when the proof for God's existence is completed, existence does enter into the very nature of God; but we cannot presuppose that when starting off on the task of proving God does exist. In other words, a conclusion about existence cannot be drawn from premises which do not assert the existence of anything; to assert the existence of something in the conclusion of a line of reasoning, you must assert the existence of something somewhere among the premises.

Ontological "Proofs"

The contrary is the sophism inherent in all a priori or ontological proofs for God's existence, the sophism which Kant attributed to all proofs for God's existence. He argued that some concept of God is essential at the start of any proof for the existence of God and such a concept includes the notion of God's existence. Kant is right, of course, in maintaining that some concept of God is necessary from the very beginning of these proofs; after all, the proofs are trying to prove something. But it is quite enough, for the purpose of the proofs, that that concept be no more than a statement of the absence of contradiction between God and existence; in other words, that concept, required to begin the proofs, need be no more than a construct which demands only the possibility of the union of the subject and predicate in the proposition "God exists."

Experience assures us emphatically that we do not have a direct sense knowledge of God's existence. When, in the course of this volume, we learn more about the divine nature, we shall see why we cannot have a sense knowledge of God. For the present, it is sufficient to accept the dictum of experience and concentrate our efforts along the only line of proof left open to us, the inferential or a posteriori proof, the proof of the cause from the effects.


Monday, August 4, 2025

American Speaker of The House Johnson prays at Wailing Wall

 


Mr. Speaker. A question for you, Sir. We all saw you spending time in prayer at the wall and we saw you put a folded up piece of paper in there.

While you were at the wall, did you find the Epstein List?

Speaker Johnson: Thank you for the question. No, I did not find the Epstein List and, believe me, I looked all over the place.

When I get back to Washington, I will consult with my AIPAC handler and see if he has any ideas.

Mr. Speaker; Another question. Why are you praying with and supporting the Jews of whom Jesus  taught that they were not with Him so they were against Him?

Speaker Johnson; I didn't know that. Is that in Genesis too?

 I am delighted to be here today to pray with the Jews because the Bible says to support Israel.


Mr. Speaker; Where are you going? I have just one more question. Why are you praying with Jews who hate both Jesus and God?

In the Gospel of John, Chapter 15, 22-25. Jesus teaches;


If I had not come and spoken unto them, they would not have sin: but now they have no cover for their sin.
9 Commentaries

He that hates me hates my Father also.
5 Commentaries
If I had not done among them the works which no other man did, they would not have sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father.
4 Commentaries
But this comes to pass, that the word might be fulfilled that is written in their law, They hated me without a cause










Sunday, August 3, 2025

The Jews and The Holy Land (Christian Zionism

 

Romans 2:28 For he is not a Jew, who is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh:



Tertullian of Carthage

AD 220

The flesh; and "the Jew which is one inwardly "will 
be a subject of the self-same God as he also is who 
is "a Jew outwardly; ". On exactly the same 
principle, they consider the special soil of Judaea to 
be that very holy land, which ought rather to be 
interpreted of the Lord's flesh, which, in all those 
who put on Christ, is thenceforward the holy land; 
holy indeed by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, 
truly flowing with milk and honey by the sweetness 
of His assurance, truly Judaean by reason of the 
friendship of God. For "he is not a Jew which is one 
outwardly, but he who is one inwardly."

Of God  introducing the spiritual circumcision

Saturday, August 2, 2025

The Nuclear Family in Nevada

 


Is there anything more romantically and quintessentially American than a Mother and her Son in Nevada watching a mushroom cloud rise up just before the sun goes down ?


Someday, Junior, our President will be able to kill millions of  people he doesn't like with just the push of a button. 

Now, would my little warrior like some mac and cheese while we watch Howdy Doody?


Friday, August 1, 2025

Newman said the Church began as an idea. Is that accurate?

 How can Newman be named a Doctor of the Church when the Church has always taught Jesus established a visible church whereas Saint Newman said the Church was an idea?


Matt 16 accord to Cornelius a Lapide:


When He was come . . . Cesarea Philippi. This was a town of Phœnicia, situated at the foot of Lebanon. It was previously called Dan, because it had been captured by that tribe: and because two streams, named Jor and Dan, there unite and form the river Jordan. But because the name of Pan, the god of shepherds, was better known to the Gentiles than the Hebrew tribe Dan, the place was called by them Paneas. Afterwards, Philip, the son of Herod of Ascalon, who was tetrarch of Ituræa and Trachonites, enlarged it and made it the capital of his tetrarchy, and called it Cesarea, in honour of Tiberius Cæsar. It must be distinguished from the Cesarea between Dor and Joppa, which is called in the Acts absolutely Cesarea of Palestine. It was the boundary of Canaan, as promised by God to the Israelites towards the north, as Beersheba was its boundary on the south. Many of the neighbouring Gentiles flocked to this city. Therefore Christ retired to it upon this occasion, that He might teach the Gentiles as well as the Jews, and that He might speak with more freedom about the Messiah. For in Judea it was perilous to speak upon this subject; since the Scribes were ready to accuse Him to the Roman governors of aiming at royal power, and of treason against Cæsar. Again this city had been a seat of idolatry, (Judges xviii. 29, &c.). Christ therefore wished to cleanse it from this stain, and to bring it to the worship of God, yea to be the beginning and the matrix of Gentile Christian nations. It is now in the possession of the Turks, and is called Belima. 

When do men say, &c. i.e., whom do they say that I, who out of humility, am wont to call Myself the Son of Man, am? And, especially I now so call Myself, that I may examine your faith concerning Me, 0 ye Apostles. The Syriac less correctly divides the sentence, in this manner, What do men say concerning Me, that I am the Son of Man? For Christ does not here ask whether He be so called, but asserts that He is the Son of Man, and goes on to ask what further men think about Him. 

But some said . . . or one of the Prophets. The common people among the Jews were aware that for several hundred years Prophets had failed to be amongst them, together with the ark of the covenant and the oracles from the mercy seat. Thus they thought that Christ was not a new Prophet, but one of the ancient Prophets. For in Christ they beheld their virtues: their miracles and their doctrine. Few indeed were they who believed with certainty that He was the Messiah. By far the greater number did not believe. They were offended at His humility and His poverty. They thought Messiah would come with regal pomp as the Son of Solomon; as the Jews still think and expect. Wherefore although some of the people had recently said, when they saw so many miracles done by Christ, “Is not this the Son of David?” and, “This is indeed that Prophet which should come into the world;” yet this was a sudden and transient cry, elicited by beholding a miracle, not a firm and settled opinion: thus Abulensis. They thought that the soul of one of the Prophets had passed into Christ by metempsychosis. So Jansen and Baronius. Or more probably they thought one of the prophets had risen again, and Jesus was he; as though Jesus were really John the Baptist, Elias, or Jeremias: For the Pharisees and the Jews generally believed in the resurrection of the dead. This indeed is plain from what Herod said of Christ: This is John himself who is risen from the dead, and therefore mighty works do show themselves in Him. Some thought Jesus to be John the Baptist, because he appeared to be very like him in age, in sanctity and in his preaching. And since John had been shortly before put to death by Herod, he was fresh in their memory, and seemed to be worthy of rising again. Others thought Christ was Elias, on account of the like zeal in both; and because Elias was not yet dead, and was expected by all the Jews to return according to the prophecy of Malachi (iv. 5): “Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet.” They thought therefore that Elias had returned, and that Jesus was he. Others were of opinion that Christ was Jeremiah, because Jeremiah was a most holy man, and a mirror of patience and charity; and because some thought Jeremiah would return with Elias to preach to the Jews, being moved by those words, “I have given thee for a prophet to the Gentiles.” (Jer. i. 5.) 

Jesus saith to them, but whom do ye, &c. From the words but you, S. Jerome gathers that Christ here tacitly, as it were, calls the Apostles gods. “They indeed, because they are men have human ideas, but ye, who are gods, whom do ye think that I am?” But S. Chrysostom says with regard to the subject itself, “The Lord by His second question admonishes His disciples to think more loftily concerning Him. By the very manner of His interrogation, He shows that those common opinions fell far short of His dignity. You, He says, who have been always with Me, and who yourselves have done so many miracles in My name, whom do ye say that I am?” 

Simon Peter answering, &c He who was called Simon when he was circumcised, was by Christ named Cephas, i.e., Peter. Some think Peter, as it were the mouth of the Apostles, answered not for himself alone, but for all. So S. Jerome, also Anselm, S, Thomas, the Gloss, Dionysius, Lyra, Jansen, and S. Augustine. Also S. Ambrose (l. de Incarn. c. 4). With more probability S. Hilary, Abulensis, Maldonatus, Francis Lucas, Barradi, and others think Peter spoke for himself, and his own feeling. For the other Apostles being silent, and hesitating what reply to give, Peter being wiser than the rest, forasmuch as he was taught of God, and being more fervent, lest any one should answer unworthily concerning Christ, dashed in with his answer, and replied on behalf of all: not because he knew the mind of all, for he had not spoken with them concerning the matter, but because he wished that his own opinion should be common to them all. This was what S. Jerome and the others who have been cited really meant, namely, that Peter, as about to be constituted after the resurrection the Prince of the Apostles and of the whole Church, being more deeply taught and inspired by God, recognized the Divinity of Christ, and answered concerning it what all the rest would have answered. This is plain, because to Peter only, as the reward of this confession, Christ promised the most ample reward and prerogative. For he says to him by name above the rest of the Apostles, “Blessed art thou Simon Bar-jona,” &c. 

Thou art the Christ, &c. Gr. ό Χριστός, with the article. Thou, I say, art the Christ, or Messiah, i.e., anointed by God with the unction of the grace of the hypostatic Union with the WORD, and by this consecrated the Chief Doctor, High Priest, Prophet, and King of the world. Doctor, that Thou mayest teach men the will and law of God: High Priest, that by offering Thyself a sacrifice to God, Thou mayest reconcile the world to God; a prophet, that Thou mayest declare the secret things of God, and foretell things to come: a king that Thou mayest rule over Heaven and earth, and all the things which in them are. 

Son of God: Not by grace and adoption, as all the saints are sons of God, but by nature and the Deity communicated to Thee by God the Father, by eternal generation. Wherefore the Greek has the definite article, ό υίὸς, i.e., that Son, viz., the only natural son, of one substance with the Father. Living, who thus, formaliter lives the Divine, uncreated and beatific life, that causaliter, He breathes into all things created by Him, His own strength and vigour, and into living things, life and a soul. For from Him, as from a fountain and a sun of life, there floweth all the light and life of all angels, men, animals and plants. See what I have said on S. John i. 4. Thus S. Leo (Serm. de Transfig.): “The divine Peter, by the revelation of the Heavenly Father, overcoming corporeal things, and transcending things human, beheld the Son of the Living God, and confessed the glory of the Deity.” Thus too S. Chrysostom, Hilary, Theophylact, Euthymius, S. Augustine, and Athanasius (Serm. 3. contra Arian.), and others, passim, who from this passage prove the Divinity of Christ. 

Moreover SS. Hilary and Chrysostom and others are of opinion that S. Peter first of all men confessed the Divinity of Christ. Others deny this, saying that Nathanael confessed it before Peter, when he said, Rabbi, Thou art the Son of God, Thou are the King of Israel. Nevertheless it is plain that before this confession of Peter the Apostles acknowledged Christ to be God from His very words, and from the many and great miracles which He wrought to prove it. We see this from the words of Peter (John vi. 65 ), “Lord to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life. And we believe and are sure that Thou art that Christ the Son of God.” Also from the words of the Apostles themselves, “Verily Thou art the Son of God.” (Matth. xiv. 33.) But the Apostles, inasmuch as they were uninstructed, had formed a very confused and poor conception of this doctrine, and believed, after a sort, that Christ was truly the Son of God, above other Prophets, yea that He was God. But after what manner this was so, whether by eternal generation, or by some other way they were ignorant. But Peter being enlightened by God, recognized it distinctly, clearly, and sublimely, and first being asked concerning this thing, openly and constantly confessed the same and testified in this place, that verify, Christ was peculiarly the Son of God, that is, begotten of God the Father by eternal generation, and therefore consubstantial with Him, and very and eternal God. Christ required this faith concerning Himself from Peter and the Apostles—for the Apostles tacitly approved Peter’s confession, and tacitly confessed the same—as well because that faith is the foundation of our justification, as because the Passion and Death of Christ were at hand, in which it was needful that the Apostles should be sustained by this faith in the Divinity of Christ; lest when He was dead, they should think faith and all other things were dead with Him. This is plain from verse 21, &c. 

Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou Simon Bar-jona, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but My Father which is in heaven. That is to say, blessed and happy art thou, 0 Peter, on account of this new faith concerning Me; for this is a mighty gift and benefit, not of flesh and blood, that is, not of nature, but by the grace of God inspiring and revealing to thee this very thing. For this faith is the beginning and the foundation of all grace and glory, and therefore it shall lead thee, and many through thee and thy example and preaching, to eternal blessedness. For blessedness in the journey standeth in the faith and love of Christ: but the blessedness of the country is the vision and fruition of the same, according to those words of S. John for “this is life eternal, that they may know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent.” Hence the synod of Ephesus (Act III.) says, “Thrice most blessed and worthy of all praise is the Apostle Peter, who is the rock and the base of the Catholic Church, and the foundation of the true faith.” Hence also has arisen the custom of the faithful of addressing the Pontiff “Most Blessed Father.” Hence S. Jerome saith to Pope Damasus, “I am united to thy Blessedness,” that is, to the Chair of Peter. 

Simon Bar-jona. For the father of Simon Peter was called Johanna, that is John, as is plain from S. John xxi. 15, meaning “God hath given: or God hath pitied: or the gift of God, from ‘Ia’ which is contracted from Jehovah, and ‘chanan,’ that is, he hath visited, he hath given.” Peter, then, was the son of John, or the grace of God, because he was most pleasing to God, and full of His grace. S. Chrysostom observes, that Christ gave the addition “Bar-jona,” not only according to the Hebrew custom, which always adds the name of the father to the children, but with a special reference to Peter’s answer, as though Christ confirmed it and said, “Thou hast spoken truly, 0 Peter, that I am the Son of God, for as thou art the son of Jona, a man from a man, according to natural generation, so am I the Son of God the Father, but begotten of Him from eternity—God of God, of one substance and Godhead with Him.” Symbolically Jona, that is “a dove,” is the emblem of the Holy Ghost, who in the form of a dove came down upon Christ. In this place also he descended upon Peter, and revealed to him that Christ was verify and indeed the Son of God. Thus S. Jerome—“Peter obtains a name from his confession, because he had a revelation from the Holy Ghost, whose son he was to be called.” Bar-jona in our language signifies “the son of a dove.” “For flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee”—that is, not earthly parents nor friends nor any man who consists of flesh and blood has revealed unto thee that I am the Son of God—forasmuch as this knowledge far transcends all nature, and the natural knowledge of all men, but My Heavenly Father hath made it known to thee by the illumination of His grace. “What flesh and blood could not reveal, has been revealed by the grace of the Holy Ghost,” saith S. Jerome. By flesh, S. Hilary understands the bodily eyes of S. Peter, for they had told him that Christ was a man, but the revelation of the Father alone had made known to him that He was God. 

And I say unto thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church. “And I,” in Greek, “κα̉γὼ” i.e., but I, or now I, give back to thee as a reward, and I in turn say and promise: for as S. Jerome saith. “Christ pays back the testimony of the Apostle concerning Himself.” Peter had said, “Thou art the Christ—the Son of the living God:” this true confession received a reward, namely, “Thou art Peter.” I therefore who am the very Son of God as thou hast confessed, I the Son of God tell and assure thee, and by saying it, I make and constitute thee, Peter, so that after Me thou mayest become the rock of the Church. Christ had promised this name to Simon (S. John i. 42), Saying, “Thou shalt be called Cephas, which is interpreted Peter:” but in this place He fulfils the promise, and gives him the name of Peter in fact. S. Leo (Ser. III, Anniver. Ascens.) thus expounds: “And I say unto thee, that even as My Father hath made known to thee My excellence, so do I also make known to thee that thou art Peter, i.e., inasmuch as I am the inviolable Rock, &c., so likewise thou art a rock, because thou art strengthened by My strength, and the things which are Mine by My own power are thine by participation with Me.” 

Thou are Peter, and upon this role I will build My Church. The meaning is, thou art Peter; that is, the rock of the Church: for upon thee as upon a most solid rock I will build My Church: for the WORD declares and gives the reason why he is Peter, that is to say, “Thou art Peter, because upon thee as upon a rock I will build My Church.” S. Augustine (Tract 27, upon John, and.B. 1 Retract, C. 1) says, “Upon this Rock, that is upon Myself, because the rock was Christ,” 1 Cor. x. 4. Calvin, (B. 4, Inst. c. 6), and the heretics eagerly follow this interpretation, that they may overthrow the authority and the primacy of Peter and the Pope. But that Peter himself is here called the rock, the rest of the Fathers almost universally agree. Maldonatus and Bellarmine (B. 1, concerning the Roman Pontiff, e. 10) quote them at large. The meaning then is this, thou art “Kepha,” or “Cephas,” i.e., a rock or a very hard and very firm stone, for this is the signification of the Hebrew “Keph,” and of the Chaldee and Syriac “Kepha,” marked out and ordained by Me, that after My death, and the gift of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost, having been entirely solidified and made strong, thou mayest become the foundation of the Church which I will build upon thee. For before the coming of the Holy Ghost, Peter was very far from being the rock of the Church; yea through fear he denied Christ in His Passion. So then the word “Peter,” and “Petra,” denotes the firmness of S. Peter as a prince of the Church, and of his successors the Pontiffs, and their constancy in the faith and religion of Christ. Thus among others, Angelus Caninius on the Hebrew names of the New Testament c. xu 1. 

Moreover, that Peter is here called the Rock, is proved first, by the pronoun “this,” upon “this rock;” for since “this” is demonstrative it ought thus to be understood, viz.:—this rock of which I have spoken, and to whom I speak, i.e., thou art Peter the rock of the Church, and upon thee as upon a rock I will build My Church. For there had been no mention made of any other rock to which the pronoun “this” could refer, except Peter. It is otherwise in 1 Cor. x., for there it is said “they drank of that spiritual rock which followed them, and that rock was Christ.” Here the word rock precedes, which he explains by saying, that it was so, typically, that is to say, represented Christ: as if Christ had spoken in French He would have said “Tu es Pierre, et sur cest pierre je bastiray mon eglise.” 

You may say, Christ said not thou art petra, but thou art Petrus, and so deny that the pronoun this refers to Peter. I answer, that Christ is said to have spoken in Syriac, thou art kepha, and upon this kepha I will build, &c. For kepha means a rock, and hence Peter in Syriac was called kepha. But the Greek translator, who is followed by the Latin, gave the masculine form of the noun—namely petrus rather than petra, which is feminine: but πέτρος and πέτρα in Greek equally signify a rock or a stone. Peter therefore is the same word aspetra, but the translator made a variation for the sake of elegance, and rendered it thou art Peter and upon this petra, not upon this Petros, as in a true and proper sense he might have done, both because petra in Greek is more frequently used for a rock or a stone than petros, and because houses are properly built upon stones, not upon men. Beza allows this when he says “the Lord speaking in Syriac did not make use of a surname, but said cepha in both places, as in the vernacular the word pierr is used both as a proper and a common noun. In Greek, likewise, πέτρος and πέτρα differ only in their termination, not in their meaning.” Thus far correctly, but mistakenly he adds, “Matthew, or whoever was his translator, seems by this difference of interpretation to have intended that Peter, who is a part of the building, should be distinguished from the rock itself on which the building stands, that is from Christ; likewise that Peter himself should be distinguished from the promise of the faith which is common to the whole Church, as ancient writers also clearly prove, in order that Antichrist (so the heretics calls the Roman Pontiff) may become most ridiculous when his followers endeavour to establish his tyranny from this passage.” How petulantly and falsely Beza writes may be seen and learnt from the original passages of the Fathers which Bellarmine and Maldonatus cite, as I have already said. Besides, the text of Scripture itself is to be preferred to the translator: nor had the Greek translator a meaning different from the Syriac text, as I have previously said. I omit many other proofs, which either from what has been said, or from what will be said, will show the falsity of Beza’s conclusion. 

Secondly—The same thing is plain from this, that there would be a want of connection to say thou art Peter and upon Myself the Rock I will build My church. In this indeed there would be a lessening of the speech, and an overthrow of the benefit bestowed. For Peter might say to Christ, “I am Peter, that is the rock of the Church, how then dost thou build Thy Church not upon me but upon Thyself?” 

Thirdly—Because all that goes before and that follows refer to Peter alone: “and I,” he saith, “say to thee, 0 Peter, that is, I give and assign to thee as the reward and prerogative of thy great faith and confession, that after Myself, and after My death and resurrection, I will make thee the rock and foundation of the Church;” for this is the meaning of I will build My Church

Fourthly—Because the original oriental versions agree together in this, that petrus is the very same word as petra, and petra as petrus, whence they give the same name Kepha to Petrus and Petra. Christ therefore as Angelus Caninius says, spoke thus in Syriac: ant kepha, veal kepha hadden ebne iat tsibbuti; or as the Syriac Gospel has it, ant hu kipha, veal hada kipha ebne leidti, that is, thou art Cepha, that is a rock, and upon this Cepha, that is petra, meaning upon thee, who art Peter or a rock, “I will build my Church.” Moreover, the Hebrew Gospel, which Sebastian Munster has edited as authentic, and as written by S. Matthew himself, has in like manner atta kepha, veal kepha hazzot ebne eth macpeli. So also the Armenian Gospel: Is bim, he saith e vera ais bim, that is, thou art a rank, and upon this rock I will build, &c.; and the Arabic Gospel, ant alsachra va ala hada, alsachra abni baidti, thou art a rock, and upon that rock I will build my Church. The Æthiopic Gospel has Anta quoqueh va dibazati, quoqh annesa lebeita Christianei, that is, thou are a rock and upon this rock I will build the Christian house—that is the Church. The Coptic also has, but I say unto thee that thou art this Peter, I will found my Church upon this rock, which is none else than this Peter, otherwise there would be no connection, for he gives the reason, the because, why he will build the Church upon a rock, because indeed Peter will be a solid rock on which the whole Church being founded may rest securely as upon a strong foundation. The Persian is, “I say unto thee that thou art sanac,” i.e., a rock, “and upon this sanac,” that is, rock, “I will build my Church.” Moreover, the Persian paraphrase explains sanac as a rock, adding, thou art the rock, that is, foundation and judge. (Vide Peter Victor in Annotat. ad N. T. pp. 105, 102, where he gives at length all these versions.) 

To S. Augustine it is replied that he was misled by his ignorance of the Hebrew and Syriac languages, and therefore thought that petrus was something different from petra, and that Peter was as it were called appellatively from it Petreius, although it appears from the Syriac that Petrus and Petra are the same. Again, S. Augustine admits as probable the explanation of those who say that Peter is the rock of the Church; and in this respect he is at issue with Calvin, who is of opinion that such an explanation is blasphemy against Christ. Listen to S. Augustine in his sermon on the Chair of Peter. “Lastly, for strengthening the devotion of the churches he is called the rock; as saith the Lord, ‘thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church;’ for he is called the rock because he first laid the foundations of the faith for the nations, and like an immovable rock he holds the joints and the superstructure of the entire Christian edifice. Peter then is called a rock on account of devotion, and the Lord is called a rock on account of strength; as saith the Apostle, ‘they drank of that spiritual Rock which followed them, and that Rock was Christ.’ Rightly does he deserve an association in name who had obtained an association in work. Peter lays the foundation, Peter plants; the Lord gives the increase, the Lord waters.” The same Augustine (Serm. 16 de Sanctis) says, “Worthy was Peter to be a foundation for building up the people of God, to be a pillar for support, a key to the kingdom.” 

In fine, even if that exposition of S. Augustine were allowed, although it is not the true one, still it may thence be proved that Peter, after Christ, who is the Rock and Corner Stone of the Church, is still the next foundation, rock, or stone of the Church. For then the sense would be, I am the Rock upon which I will build the Church; but thou, 0 Peter, art next unto Me, and the next rock of the Church, upon whom immediately after Myself I will build My Church, and therefore thee only I call Peter, who before wast called Simon. By the same arguments the Magdeburg Centuriators (l. 1. cent. 1, chap. 4.) are refuted, and the Genevan ministers who in their Bibles expound thus—“upon this rock, that is, upon this confession or faith—viz.: that I am the Son of God.” For nowhere previously has this confession been called a rock, as Peter immediately before was called Cephas, that is, a rock. 

You may say, some of the Fathers, by the rock, understand the faith which Peter confessed and set forth. So S. Chrysostom, S. Hilary (l. 6 de Trinit.), S. Cyril. (l. 4 de Trinit.), S. Ambrose (l. 6 in Luc. c. 9). I answer, these Fathers do not mean the faith abstractedly, but the faith as it was in Peter, and consequently they take Peter himself to be the rock of the Church, as they themselves afterwards fully explain. They hold that Peter, for the merit of his faith received the dignity of a rock in the Church. As SS. Hilary and Chrysostom say expressly; for on account of that faith he had deserved to be himself the foundation of the Church, and that his faith should never fail, but that he should confirm and strengthen others in the faith. (S. Luke xxii. 32.) For the Church is fashioned and renewed not of faith, but of faithful men, who are as it were its parts (for the Church is nothing else than the company of the faithful), wherefore, likewise, in order that the head of the Church may be of the same nature as the body, that head must be a faithful man—that is to say, Peter and the Pontiff. The faith then is the reason of the founding, but the foundation is Peter himself. So S. Chrysostom, Cyril (l. 4 de Trinit.) and S. Ambrose, Bellarmine (l. 1 de Pont. c. 10) where he refutes both Erasmus and Chytræus, who follow Origen, who allegorizes after his custom, and understands by the rock all the faithful. In this way indeed the whole Church would be the rock, for the whole Church consists of none other than the faithful; but where then would be the walls, the floors, and the roof of the Church? Of what then shall these be built? (See also Gretser in defence of Bellarm, l. 3. c. 5.) 

Lastly, Christ bestowed this gift upon Peter as the future Pontiff of the Church; wherefore He gave the same gift to all the other Pontiffs, his successors, and that for the good of the Church, that it might be strengthened by them as by a rock, in the faith and religion of Christ. Wherefore, S. Bernard (l. 2, de Consid.) saith to Pope Eugenius, “Who art thou? A great priest—the chief Pontiff. Thou art the prince of bishops, thou art the heir of the Apostles, thou art Abel in primacy, Noah in government, Abraham in the patriarchate; in order, thou art Melchisedeck, in dignity Aaron, in authority Moses, in judgeship Samuel, in power Peter, in unction a Christ. To thee the keys have been delivered, the sheep entrusted.” 

And upon this rock. From hence it is plain that like as Cephas is derived from cepha, so is Peter from petra, indeed that he is the same as petra, as I have already shown. Wherefore, when Optatus Milevit. (l. 2, against Parmen.) and others derive Cephas from the Greek κεφαλή, that is, a head—they do it by a congruous allusion, not by a real etymology. By a similar allusion, S. Gregory Nazianzen (Orat. on the Passover) derives Phase or Pascha—which is a Hebrew word, as everybody knows (Exod. xii.), from the Greek πάσχειν, that is, to suffer. For in the Passover happened the Passion of Christ, and His immolation as the Paschal Lamb. Moreover, Christ gave this name of rock, rather than other names (such as pillar, tower, anchor, foundation, &c.), because this name of rock is given in Scripture to Christ Himself (Isaiah xxviii. 16; Psalm cxviii. 22; Matthew xxi 42.) He communicated, therefore, a share in His own name, together with His dignity and office. Thus S. Jerome; and S. Gregory (On the Seven Penitential Psalms) says: “Christ is the rock, from which rock Peter received his name, and upon which He said that He would build.” Listen to S. Leo (Serm. 3, On the Anniversary of his Accession), where he introduces Christ as speaking thus to Peter: “Since I am the rock, I the cornerstone, who make of both one; I the foundation, besides which no one can lay any other; nevertheless thou art a rock likewise, because thou art strengthened by My strength in order that what things are Mine by Mine own power, may be thine also through participation with Me: and upon this rock I will build My Church; upon this strength He says, I will construct an eternal temple, &c.” 

I will build My Church. That is to say, I therefore call thee Peter and the rock, because as a house is built upon a rock that it may rest firm and immovable upon it against every blast of the winds, so will I build upon thee, 0 Peter, as upon a most solid rock, My Church; that resting upon thee, it may abide firm against all the attacks of heretics and wicked men, and that thou mayest keep and sustain it in the true faith and worship of God, in like manner as a rocky foundation sustains and holds together the entire house which is built upon it. Thus S. Ambrose (Serm. 4) saith: “Peter is called the rock, because—like an immovable rock—he sustains the joints and the mass of the whole Christian edifice.” 

You may say all the Apostles are the foundation of the Church, as is plain from Eph. ii. 20, and Apoc. xxi. 20; so then Peter only is not the rock of the Church. I answer, that Peter is the rock and the foundation of the whole Church and of the entire body of the faithful, and therefore of the Apostles themselves. For the office of Peter—who is primate and chief—was to retain, direct, and strengthen the Apostles in faith, religion, and duty, and if at any time they should err, to correct them. Whence S. Jerome (l. 1, contra Jovin.) says: “Wherefore among twelve one is chosen, that by the appointment of a head, occasion of schism might be taken away.” And S. Cyprian (Tract on the Unity of the Church) says, “the primacy is given to Peter that it might be shown there is one Church of Christ and one Chair.” 

Observe, Christ in this place promises by two metaphors, as S. Jerome says, that after His death and resurrection He will give to Peter the principality of the Church. The first metaphor is that of a foundation or foundation rock. For that thing, which in a building is the rock and foundation, in a body is the head, in a state the ruler, in a kingdom the king, in a church the pontiff. The second metaphor is that of the keys: for keys are only given to kings and rulers. 

Observe, secondly: to build the Church upon this rock, signifies two things. First, that upon this reasonable stone—namely, Peter, as the head of all the Apostles—the care and government of the whole Church devolve next after Christ. Thus S. Chrysostom (Hom. 55), S. Ambrose (Serm. 57), S. Gregory (l. 4, Epist. 32). Secondly, that the Church rests upon and is strengthened by Peter as a foundation, as the Vicar of Christ, so that it cannot err in matters of faith. Whence Peter, on account of his lofty confession of faith, received grace from Christ to become and to be appointed this foundation rock. 

And this is the meaning of SS. Hilary, Chrysostom, Cyril—and Nyssen, in the end of his book (Contra Judæos)—when they say that the Church was built by Christ upon the faith and confession of Peter, as I have explained above. Moreover, S. Chrysostom in this place lays stress upon the words I will build, and says: “They are similar to those words ‘God said,’ in the first chapter of Genesis, by which words all things were created and subsist.” In like manner he says: “I will build, hath wrought all, even though tyrants oppose, soldiers fight, the people rage, custom struggles. For the word of God coming like a vehement fire, hath burnt up the thorns, hath cleansed the fields, hath prepared the ground, hath raised the building on high, &c.” S. Jerome also (Epist. 57), consulting Pope Damasus whether we may say there are three Hypostases in the Holy Trinity or only one—thus addresses him: “I am speaking with the successor of the fisherman, and the disciple of the Cross. I, following none first, except Christ, am united to your Blessedness; that is, in communion with the See of Peter. I know that upon that rock the Church is built. Whosoever eateth the Lamb outside of this house is profane; if any man be not in the ark of Noah, he shall perish in the swelling of the deluge.” 

And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. Namely, against the Church, because it has been founded upon Peter and his successors, as upon a most solid rock. 

The gates of hell, i.e., the infernal city, meaning all hell, with its entire army of demons, and with the whole power of Lucifer its king. For hell and the city of God, i.e., the Church, are here put in opposition. When S. Augustine wrote his work de Civitate Dei, in the beginning of which he speaks of the two opposite cities; the one of God which is the Church; the other of the devil, i.e., of demons and wicked men: he takes the gates of hell to mean heresies, and heresiarchs; for they fight against the faith of Peter and the Church, and they proceed from hell and are stirred up by the devil. So S. Epiphanius (in Ancoratu), not far from the beginning. There are here the two figures of speech—synecdoche and metonymy; for by the gates he means the whole city, both because the gate is the entrance into a city, and because the chief defences and strength of a city are wont to be at the gates, because if they and the adjoining walls are safe, the city is safe, if they are taken, the city is taken. 

Shall not prevail. Heb. lo juchelu la, i.e., shall not be able to stand against it—namely, the Church. So S. Hilary and Maldonatus. More simply, shall not prevaili.e., shall not conquer or overcome, or pull down the Church. For this is the meaning of the original Greek. We have here the figure of speech, miosis: for little is said but much is meant; not only that the Church shall not be conquered, but that she shall conquer and subdue under her all heretics, tyrants, and every other enemy, as she overcame Arians, Nestorians, Pelagians, Nero, Decius, Diocletian, &c. Therefore by this word Christ first animates his Church that she should not be faint hearted when she sees herself attacked by all the power of Satan and wicked men. In the second place, He as it were sounds a trumpet for her, that she may always watch with her armour on against so many enemies, who attack her with extreme hatred. Thirdly, He promises to her, as well as to her head, Peter, i.e., the Pontiff—victory and triumph over them all. Again, Christ and the Holy Ghost assist with special guidance her head, the Roman Pontiff, that he should not err in matters of faith, but that he may be firm as an adamant, says S. Chrysostom, and that he may rightly administer and rule the Church, and guide it in the path of safety, as Noah also directed the ark that it should not be overwhelmed in the deluge. Wherefore S. Chrysostom (Hom. de Verb. Isaiah) says: “It were more easy for the sun to be extinguished than for the Church to fail;” and again, “what can be more powerful than the Church of God: the barbarians destroy fortifications, but not even the devils overcome the Church. When it is attacked openly, it conquers; when it is attacked by treachery, it overcomes.” S. Augustine on the Psalms against the Donatists, says: “Reckon up the Bishops even from the very Pontificate of Peter. That is the very rock which the proud gates of hell conquer not.” This has been made especially plain in the conversion of all nations, specially of Rome and the Romans. For Rome being the head, both of the world and of idolatry, where the idols of all nations were worshipped, has been converted from them by S. Peter and his successors, and has bowed down her proud head to the cross of Christ, which thing is of all miracles the greatest. 

And I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven. Thee—who art one person—namely, Bar-jona, or the son of Jona, as is plain from everything which precedes and follows. Not therefore in this place were the keys of Heaven promised to Peter in the person of the Church, or primarily to the Church herself, as the heretics take it, but to Peter himself as the head of the Church; and through him to the Church and her ministers, in like manner as to the same Peter they were specially given and consigned by Christ after His resurrection, when He said: “Feed My sheep.” Thus the Greek and Latin Fathers explain, passim, whose words Bellarmine recites (l. 1 de Pontiff, c. 12), where in like manner he proves at length that this is the meaning of S. Augustine, when he says that Peter bore the figure of the Church because indeed Peter was a representative of the Church as a king of a kingdom: for so indeed S. Augustine explains himself (Tract. ult. upon S. John), where he says: “Of this Church the Apostle Peter, on account of the primacy of his Apostleship, was a kind of general representative.” And on Psalm 109, “Of which Church he is acknowledged to be the representative, on account of the primacy which was his among the disciples.” Wherefore for the good of the Church Peter, as her head, received the keys from Christ; from which it is also plain that Christ promised the keys to Peter as a future Pontiff, and consequently promised the same keys to the other Roman Pontiffs, successors of Peter. For Christ in this place had regard to a most necessary matter, and of the highest moment to His ever-abiding Church—that is to say, to its perpetual head; and He ordained the best and most abiding constitution for her, namely, the monarchical, that the one Church of Christ should be ruled by the one Roman Pontiff, as S. Cyprian teaches on the Unity of the Church; S. Jerome (l. 1, contra. Jovin.), and others, passim. Our Gretzer, and after him Adam Contsen, ably refute the cavils of Calvin and his followers about this passage. The keys—you will ask what the keys here signify. Calvin answers (l. 4, Inst. c. 6, sec. 3), that they signify both the power to preach the Gospel, as well as the forgiveness of sins to him who believes the Gospel which promises forgiveness. But this is a jejune and worthless explanation. For by keys doors are opened, not the mouths of preachers. Whence keys specially belong to kings and rulers; not to doctors, and teachers, and preachers; wherefore the keys here signify properly the right to rule; whereunto pertains not only power to preach the Gospel, but also to absolve sins, to admonish, to ordain priests, to interpret Holy Scripture, to excommunicate, and to do all other things which pertain to the good government of the Church. 

I say therefore, by the keys is here signified the chief power, both of order and jurisdiction, over the whole Church, promised and delivered in this place by Christ to Peter. For with such an object in view the keys of the cities are delivered to kings and princes. And Christ thus explains the keys in what follows, when He says: Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, &c. For he who hath the keys of a house, or of a city is its lord, to open or shut it at his pleasure: to admit into it, and to shut out of it whom he will. There is an allusion to Is. c. xxii., where God promising the principality of the synagogue to Eliakim, the Pontiff of the Old Testament, says: “And I will lay upon his shoulder the key of the house of David, so he shall open, and none shall shut; and he shall shut and none shall open.” Moreover, Eliakim was a type of Christ as a priest, of whom it is said (Rev. xxi.), “I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband.” The sense then is this—I, Christ, will give to thee, Peter, as a Pontiff, and consequently to all the other Popes who come after thee, the keys of the kingdom of heaven, by which I mean supreme authority to rule the universal Church dispersed throughout the whole world, that by the keys, i.e., by thy power in opening or shutting the Church to men, thou mayest open or shut heaven to them. Where observe Christ said not, I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of earth, lest an earthly and temporal power should be thought to be meant, but of the kingdom of heaven, that this power might be properly and directly exercised in spiritual things, which are those that pertain to the kingdom of heaven; but that it should be exercised only indirectly with reference to temporal things, being such as are necessary, or at least very profitable to spiritual matters. Thus S. Chrysostom (Hom. 55) teaches that by the delivery of these keys by Christ to Peter there was committed to him the care and government of the whole world, and that he was created pastor and head of the entire Church. Thus also S. Gregory (l. 4, ep. 32) says: “It is plain to all who know the Gospel that by the Lord’s voice the care of the whole Church has been committed to S. Peter, the chief of all the Apostles.” And he immediately adds the reason, “for to him it is said, I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” Thus also S. Hilary on this passage, and S. Leo, (Serm. 2 in Anniv. Assum.), and others, passim. Listen also to S. Augustine (Serm 28 de Sanct.) “Peter alone among the Apostles had grace to hear, thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church.” Worthy indeed was he to be a foundation stone for building up the people in the house of God; to be a pillar to support them, a key for the kingdom. Hence also S. Ambrose (l. 2, ep. 13) to his sister Marcellina—when he records the contest which he had with the Arians, who had demanded that the keys of the Cathedral of Milan, over which he presided should be delivered to them, and that by the command of the Emperor Valentinian the younger, who was ruled by his mother Justina, an Arian—said: “The order is given,—‘Deliver up the Cathedral.’ I answer, it is neither lawful for me to deliver it, nor is it fitting for thee, 0 Emperor, to receive it. Thou hast no right to intrude upon the house of a private person, dost thou think, that God’s house may be taken away? It is alleged, all things are lawful to the Emperor, for all things are his. I answer, Do not burden thyself, 0 Emperor, to think that thou hast any imperial right over those things which are Divine. Do not lift up thyself, but if thou wouldst reign long, be subject to God, for it is written, Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s. To the Emperor pertain palaces, but churches to the priesthood. To him has been committed the power over the public fortifications, not of sacred buildings.” Thus Hosius, bishop of Cordova, president of the Nicene Counsel, steadfastly replied to the Arian Emperor Constantius, when he made a similar demand; that to him belonged the keys of the cities, but the keys of the church to the Pontiff alone. “To thee” he says, “God has committed the empire, to us he has entrusted what belongs to the Church.” 

Tropologically, the keys denote the industry, skill and wisdom in ruling which ought to exist in a Pontiff; for a key ought to be skilfully placed, fitted to, and turned in the lock, that the door may be opened; so “the art of arts is the government of souls,” says S. Gregory in his Pastoral. 

And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven. Whatsoeveri.e., whomsoever, but he says whatsoever, because the neuter gender is fuller and of more universal application than the masculine. For the Pontiff binds and looses not men only, but sins, vows, oaths, &c. There is a transition from the metaphor of the keys to the kindred metaphor of binding and loosing; for to open and shut, to bind and loose, are akin. Whence, by it, he signifies the same thing—that by the keys and by the rock are meant the supreme authority of Peter and the Pontiffs in ruling the Church. The power therefore of binding is a very ample one, and is exercised by Peter and the Pontiff in various ways. First, by not absolving but retaining sins and offences, and by refusing sacramental absolution in the sacrament of penance to such as are unworthy, and without the proper dispositions, so likewise by refusing the Eucharist and other sacraments. (S. John xx. 23.) Second, by enjoining penance to the lapsed. Third, by binding such as are guilty with excommunication and other ecclesiastical censures. Fourth, by enjoining laws and precepts with respect to feasts, fasts, tithes, &c., upon the faithful. Fifth, by binding Christians with definitions of faith, when the Pontiff, ex cathedra, defines and declares what is to be believed, what is to be rejected, as erroneous and heretical, what monastic orders are good, what are not—what estate of life is honourable and lawful—what is not, &c. Hence, from the contraries, it is plain what is meant by loosing; namely, to absolve and to release from the aforesaid obligations. Christ therefore here explains the power of the keys through the metaphor, not of opening and shutting, which are the two proper offices of keys, but by one more powerful, that is of chains, by binding men with them, or loosing those that are bound; which power S. Peter and the Roman Pontiffs, his successors, have received from Christ over all men whatsoever, throughout the whole world. The Pontiffs, nevertheless, give a share of this power, as they think good, to bishops and pastors and other ministers of the Church subordinate to them; and therefore Christ said to the other Apostles also (Matthew xviii. 18): Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever ye shall 1oose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven; by which words the same power is given to the Apostles by Christ over the whole world which is here given to Peter; but the same power is here given in an especial manner to Peter only, to signify that he has the primacy and the principality in this power, so as to be able by it to be direct, constrain, correct the other Apostles, as it were subordinate to him, and committed to his care, and hence that he might, if indeed it were needful, deprive them of it. Whence the Synod of Alexandria, over which S. Athanasius presided, agreeable to the council of Nice, writes to Pope Felix that the power of binding and loosing has been, by a special privilege granted, above others, to the Roman See by the Lord Himself. 

Upon earth: (Following upon these words à Lapide enters upon a discussion as to how far, and in what manner the jurisdiction of the Supreme Pontiff extends over souls in hell or purgatory. He gives various opinions of theologians, not apparently of the very highest authority, which it would be wearisome to translate, and then concludes the discussion, summing up as follows: Translator.) In fine it is more agreeable to truth that the Pope possesses judicial power to bind and loose those only who are living upon the earth, but not the dead. When therefore he gives indulgences applicable to the departed, it is not in the way of judicial absolution, because the dead are no longer under his jurisdiction, but by way of suffrages, as he is accustomed fully to express in his Bulls—namely, by expending for the dead so much of the treasure of the Church, of which he is the steward, as the departed owe of penalties to God. For this treasure is upon earth, and is at the disposal of the Pontiff. This is the opinion of S. Thomas, Bonaventura, Alensis, Gabriel, Major, Richardus, Cajetan, D. Soto, Navarre, and Bellarmine (Tract. de Indul.), whom Suarez cites and follows (de Pœnit: Disp. 53, s. 2. n. et seq.), who also adds, that properly and directly the Pontiff can neither excommunicate the dead, nor absolve them from excommunication, but only indirectly, in so far as he may directly forbid, or permit the living to pray for one who is dead, and by so doing may deprive the dead indirectly of the suffrages of the Church, as though they had been excommunicated—or, on the other hand, may give them a share in those suffrages, in the same manner as if he absolved them from excommunication. When, therefore, Christ saith here to Peter Whatsoever thou shall loose, &c., by loosing is to be understood not only judicial absolution, but every dispensation, favour and grace as well, which, by the efficacy of that power, has been conferred upon him by Christ, and of this kind is that dispensing of the treasure of the Church which, by way of suffrages, the Pontiff expends and applies for the benefit of the faithful departed. This then is the meaning of the words upon earth. 

Then He commanded . . . Jesus the Christ. Some Greek MSS. and the Syriac omit the word Jesus. Then the sentence flows more clearly; for all men knew that He was called Jesus, but they did not know that He was Messiah, or Christ, the true Son of God. Christ did not wish the Apostles to preach this doctrine to others, for two reasons; first, because they themselves were not as yet sufficiently instructed and confirmed in it. Secondly, because Christ was about to be put to death by the Jews. Wherefore the Jews would have been scandalised if the Apostles had preached that He was Messiah and God, and would have said to them, Away with your Christ to destruction, Who would make us Deicides—even as the Jews say to Christians now; wherefore, had they once cast away faith in Christ, they would not have hearkened to it any more, even though it had been attested afterwards by miracles. Thus they were to wait for the death, the glory, and the resurrection of Christ; that then they might proclaim Him to be Messiah and the Son of God, and confirm this doctrine by miracles, and persuade the people, as they did at Pentecost (Acts ii.), according to the words: “Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in Heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth.” (Phil. ii. 9, 10.) Thus S. Jerome: “Preach Me when I shall have suffered those things, since it is not expedient that Christ should be publicly proclaimed, and His majesty made commonly known among the people, when they are about shortly to behold Him scourged and crucified.” 

From that time forth began Jesus, &c. Gr. α̉πὸ τότεi.e., from this time in which He had made known to them His Divinity, He began to teach them concerning His Passion and Death. For there are two chief points of faith—namely, Christ’s Divinity, and His Humanity, together with His Cross and Passion, by which He redeemed the world. There was also another reason—lest when the Apostles beheld Christ put to death, they should doubt concerning His Divinity; and He would show them that the two things were not inconsistent. For in this way only could He make perfect satisfaction to the justice of God for the sins of Adam and his posterity. Lastly, He wished to instruct men how to imitate Him and bear His cross.